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Abstract. This paper addresses the development of trust in the use of Open Da-
ta through incorporation of appropriate authentication and integrity parameters 
for use by end user Open Data application developers in an architecture for 
trustworthy Open Data Services.The advantages of this architecture scheme is 
that it is far more scalable, not another certificate authority hierarchy with mas-
sive dispersion of key certificates which has of late become too widespread and 
unmanageable. With the use of a Public Key File, if the key is compromised; it 
is a simple matter of the single responsible entity replacing the key pair with a 
new one and re-performing the data file signing process. Responsibility for 
Open Data is separated from any other certificate authority that might be used 
by the publishing entity. Under this proposed architecture, the Open Data envi-
ronment does not interfere with the internal security schemes that might be em-
ployed by the entity. However, this architecture incorporates, when needed, pa-
rameters from the entity, e.g. person who authorized publishing as Open Data, 
at the time that datasets are created/added.  
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1 Introduction 
During the course of his doctoral study, Roy Fielding generalized the architectural 
principles that drove the Web conceived of by Tim Berners-Lee in the early 1990s 
and presented these principles as an architectural style which was underpinned by a 
framework of constraints. This framework was named Representational State Transfer 
(REST) [1] and systems which adhere to this framework are called “RESTful” sys-
tems or services. Because of the REST framework’s ease of use and deployment, it 
has since been used in a variety of other development methodologies, including web 
services and application programming interface (API) development, and has since 
become a serious rival to the use of the earlier Simple Object Access Protocol 
(SOAP) [2] which is a successor to the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) programming 
style. These SOAP and REST based APIs have been used to communicate data and 
information in many fields, most recently, Open Data.  
Open Data is data that can be freely used, shared and built-on by anyone, anywhere 
for any purpose [3]. The recent global trends towards Open Data have organizations 
and governments relying on these APIs to communicate Open Data in a greater extent 
than before. The United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia among others, 
use a software called the Comprehensive Knowledge Archive Network (CKAN), an 
open source data management platform to manage and publish their Open Data [4]. 
CKAN’s Action API is based on the RPC programming style. Another well-known 
Open Data Management Suite is Socrata. The Socrata Open Data API (SODA) pro-
vides an open, standards-based REST API [5]. In the case of the United States, the 
wide variety of government services and organizations has led to the use of both 
CKAN [6] and SODA [7] at the state and federal government levels.  
One of the key advantages of Open Data is that it increases the availability of data 
for consumers in decision making as well as providing potential for massive cost re-
duction through implicit outsourcing of information system development. At regional 
governmental level, a combination of Open Data with appropriate interrogation pro-
grams could possibly replace physical publication of such documents as guidebooks, 
listings, etc. The active interest and  support  by various national and international 
non-governmental organization as well as state and federal government sponsored 
‘hackathons’ such as GovHack [8] and HealthHack [9] aiming to develop new appli-
cations that use Open Data also could lead to a strong upsurge in the use of Open Data 
in various fields. 
As the capacity for acquiring and storing data increasing from year to year and 
with data analytics exerting greater influence on decision making than in years past, 
trust has to be placed in not just the processes and algorithms used to analyse data, but 
in the authenticity and integrity of data as well. There is now a fast developing trend 
for enterprises; both public and private, to incorporate Open Data with proprietary and 
private data collections in order to provide better trend and other reports.  However, 
how can users trust conclusions or decisions made on the basis of results obtained 
from largely, untrusted data with essentially unknown provenance?  
An adversary, wishing to use any means necessary to cause disruption, may wish 
to misuse the Open Data movement to achieve this disruption within the society by: 
1. Diverting Open Data requests to a fraudulent site containing fraudulent datasets 
2. Insertion of a fraudulent dataset into a legitimate site 
3. Deliberate modification of a legitimate dataset 
4. Denial of  Service should Open Data become an integral and essential part of a 
community service 
Therefore, it becomes of vital significance to ensure the authenticity and integrity of 
Open Data in order to placing trust in decision making based on that same Open Data, 
for users, businesses, industry and government alike. 
2 Paper Scope 
The definition of “Open” in Open Data can be summed up in the statement by the 
Open Knowledge Foundation that: “Open means anyone can freely access, use, modi-
  
fy (build upon), and share for any purpose (subject, at most, to requirements that pre-
serve provenance and openness).” [10] Provenance in this case, is taken to mean the 
authenticity and integrity of data. In keeping with this statement, methods such as 
encryption which acts to preserve the confidentiality aspect of data may not be com-
pletely relevant in the broad philosophy of Open Data, but may be briefly discussed.  
There are two aspects to Open Data; 1) the management of Open Data collections, 
one of which involves actions by an authoritative source like adding, modifying or 
deleting datasets, and, 2) the usage or modification of datasets post-addition. This 
paper addresses development of trust in the usage or adaptation of Open Data through 
the incorporation of appropriate authentication and integrity parameters for data in-
cluded in end-user Open Data applications by developers. The principle here is that 
the average person would not normally access raw Open Data collections but would 
view them through the lens of an appropriate application. The user would therefore 
need to be able to trust both the authenticity and integrity of data supplied by the ap-
plication. 
The proposed architecture makes use of the Domain Name System Security Exten-
sions (DNSSEC) for host/server verification. However, the full description of 
DNSSEC functionality lies outside the scope of this paper, and will only be briefly 
discussed in relation to how it fits into the proposed architecture as a whole. Forth-
coming papers may discuss this aspect in more detail. It should be noted that 
DNSSEC does not use digital certificates but rather a public key hierarchical registry. 
The paper will also discuss the proposed architecture’s use of a public key hierar-
chical registry and digital signatures instead of the traditional certificate authority for 
the authentication of data publishers and integrity of datasets. Future work will in-
clude the results of implementation and further testing. 
3 Related Work 
A search of the Web revealed few academic sources on REST Security in relation to 
Open Data. In Fielding’s thesis [1], REST was designed to provide simplicity of im-
plementation and scalability but has no pre-defined security protection mechanisms 
[11] when compared to SOAP, which uses the WS-Security [12] standard. In response 
to this, several authors have recently suggested mechanisms by which to provide se-
curity for REST: 
Forsberg [13] proposed an approach where content protection was based on keys 
being delivered to clients via secure session. Forsberg’s approach eliminates the need 
for repeated SSL/TLS encryption of cached content. Forsberg further notes that their 
solution is adjusted to match better with caching for data that requires confidentiality 
protection. An approach which used extended HTTP headers to effect extended 
username tokens was proposed by Dunlu et al. [14] for user authentication. A second-
ary password for the username token was required in order to avoid leakage of user 
password. The approach proposed by Serme et al. [15] had some similarities to Dunlu 
et al. where they used extended HTTP headers, except that Serme’s approach uses the 
HTTP headers to convey digital certificate and encryption information.  
Lee and Mehta [16], investigating some of the security threats to REST-based Web 
Services concluded that although message encryption by HTTPS was a costly protec-
tion method, HTTPS-based data transfer was the best method to ensure data confiden-
tiality. Backere et al. [17] states that the best solution to the RESTful security prob-
lem, or the one most conforming to RESTful principles, is to differentiate between 
messages that need to be encrypted and those that do not, that a message is not-
modifiable, and that replayed messages be avoided. They propose a login and REST 
resource access mechanism that leveraged these concepts. 
There is a common consensus that it is necessary for appropriate security mecha-
nisms to be employed in REST Web Services, however the means of accomplishing 
this as well as the security properties to be protected vary from approach to approach. 
Most of the solutions presented by these authors however, focus on authenticating the 
user or protecting the confidentiality of information held in RESTful systems. This 
however, begs the question: Is it necessary to protect the confidentiality of publicly 
available Open Data, or even to authenticate users of Open Data?  
The answer to this question is: Open Data by its very nature is public data, there-
fore it should be viewable by the public and not restricted by confidentiality mecha-
nisms. With this, authentication of the end user for read-only access to Open Data is 
not strictly necessary. Having said this, restricting access to the methods that can be 
used to alter Open Data resources to authenticated entities, such as the original pub-
lisher of the data, or other authorized parties is still required. An important quality 
that was brought up by Backere et al. [17] which relates to Open Data is that messag-
es and content should be unmodifiable, which basically refers to the integrity of Open 
Data resources and collections even as they are transferred and cached over the Web.  
Diffie and Hellman [18] proposed a “public file” which could be used for authenti-
cation purposes, requiring only one key to function. And, by making the public file 
read-only, this enables one personal appearance to authenticate an identity many 
times over. This public file would work, in principle, and in conjunction with modern 
public key cryptography, as a central authority, to identify communication from a 
specific identity, and establish a hierarchy of trust. This approach has proven unpopu-
lar when compared with the public key certificate concept proposed by Kohnfelder 
[19]. The public key certificate authentication scheme based on Kohnfelder’s thesis is 
now ubiquitous, however, several issues with it have been highlighted by Clarke [20], 
most notably privacy and the problems with certificate revocation.  
Rivest attempts to address the issue of certificate revocation by proposing that 
proper certificate infrastructure organization can allow a signer to present a collection 
of certificates as evidence of authenticity [21]. Another paper authored a few years 
later by McDaniels and Rubin [22] posits that addressing PKI requirements in large, 
loosely coupled environments using certificate revocation lists is difficult. A web 
environment based on REST is designed to be a large, loosely coupled environment, 
as envisioned by Fielding. [1]  
  
4 Proposed Solution 
This paper proposes a Trustworthy Architecture for Open Data Systems (Fig. 1.) 
which would serve as a precaution against tampering, enabling users to know when a 
particular resource is genuine or has been tampered with, thus augmenting the REST 
framework. As mentioned in a previous section, the encryption of request-response 
messages is not as mission-critical for communicating Open Data. However, 
measures to protect message integrity and authenticity are still required. This ap-
proach is also generic enough to be used in APIs of varying styles. 
 
Fig. 1. Trustworthy Architecture for Open Data Systems 
4.1 Key Components 
The architecture proposed hinges on several key components, a Key Generation com-
ponent, a Public Key File, DNSSEC and a Verifier Module which interfaces with 
regular REST framework activity as needed. 
Certificate Authority vs Public Key Registry. Effective key management is essen-
tial for the smooth operation of cryptographic systems. In regular circumstances, the 
Trusted Certificate Authority is responsible for issuing digital certificates and main-
taining certificate currency and revocation lists, and is also responsible for the genera-
tion of cryptographic key pairs and digital signatures. It is the interactions of these 
two separate components which provide practical key management for practical pub-
lic key cryptosystems as proposed in Kohnfelder’s thesis [19]. If a certificate model is 
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to be used then this would be the normal procedure, however, given that Open Data is 
of its own essence, “open”, proposing a complex certificate architecture including 
certificate revocation could be overkill. Moreover, access to confidentiality/privacy 
services and mechanisms is not required. It would seem reasonable, then, that each 
Open Data entity could maintain its own public key, relevant to verification of data 
integrity alone, in an appropriately managed and controlled public key registry (PKR) 
file similar to the Diffie-Hellman suggested “public file” approach, in line with the 
philosophy used in DNSSEC. 
Public Key Registry. The word “Registry” is used in this case in the sense that it is a 
central location where public keys associated with recognized identities may be re-
trieved. It is proposed that any entity wishing to publish Open Data generates a cryp-
tographic key pair and submit the public key to the Open Data Public Key File main-
tained by this Registry (using the Key Generation and Signing Module). Users of 
Open Data will then be able to retrieve the appropriate public key to verify a signature 
from this central location. 
Key Generation and Signing Module (KENNEL). For ease of explanation the Key 
Generation and Signing module will be referred to as KENNEL. To become an Open 
Data Publisher, owners of Open Data first need to use KENNEL to generate a crypto-
graphic key pair. The module then submits the generated Public Key to the Registry 
along with sufficient proof of identity over a secure channel (Fig. 2.). This infor-
mation will be the basis of a record in the Public Key File. (Fig. 3.) 
  
 
Fig. 2.   Open Data Publisher Process using KENNEL 
Steps Description 
1, 2, 3 DNSSEC enabled Address Resolution 
4, 5, 6 KENNEL-Registry interaction: Public Key Record creation 
7, 8 KENNEL-Data Store interaction: Open Data signing and storage 
Table 1. Process of Fig. 2. Open Data Publisher Process using KENNEL 
 
 Fig. 3. Role of the Open Data Certificate Authority in relation to the Open Data Publisher 
The Open Data Publisher is responsible for maintaining the secrecy of its Private Key, 
and uses this key in conjunction with a cryptographic one-way hashing function to 
generate a Digital Signature. 
Verifier Module (HOUND). For ease of reference, the Verifier will be referred to as 
HOUND. After address resolution with DNSSEC implemented is accomplished, a 
request for resources reaches the server and the server responds with the appropriate 
resource which is digitally signed. At the client-side, HOUND reads the server re-
sponse, extracting signer’s identity, retrieves the matching public key from its Public 
Key Record and verifies the digital signature.  
A message digest is recovered by decrypting the digital signature with a valid pub-
lic key and is compared to a message digest computed at the recipient end of the 
communication. If both digests are identical, then the response is considered to be 
authentic and retains its integrity. The operation of the verifier terminates and the 
content is then passed to the Renderer and is displayed in whichever format is appli-
cable. If the digests are not identical, then the recipient is alerted to the fact that the 
resource may be fraudulent or has been altered in transit. 
DNSSEC. The Internet Engineering Task Force has developed RFC3833 [23] the 
Domain Name System Security Extension specification to resolve various threats to 
the DNS using public-key cryptography to establish a chain of trust, which in practice 
means that each DNS records are digitally signed. DNSSEC does not make use of 
digital certificates but rather a public key hierarchical registry. 
In order for DNSSEC to be incorporated, the domain host first needs to have 
DNSSEC enabled on the server-side and the client needs to install a DNSSEC valida-
tor which can read verification information from the server. 
4.2 Use Case Scenario 
Communication without the proposed architecture. A request for data to a server 
follows a standard request-response paradigm. This is an example of a standard HTTP 
request for a resource without the use of the proposed architecture: 
Open Data Public Key 
Registry
Public Key File Public Key Record
Open Data Publisher Generates Key Pair
Submitted Public 
Verification Key
  
#REQUEST 
GET /dataset/…/streetsandsuburbs HTTP/1.1\r\n 
Host: opendataregistry.org 
Address Resolution is performed after the initial request is made by the Domain 
Name System. DNS uses Root or Authoritative Name Servers which are heavily sup-
plemented by DNS caches as a workaround to reduce DNS traffic and increase effi-
ciency. Caching DNS request-response records reduces load on individual servers but 
is vulnerable to DNS cache poisoning and other interception attacks. 
#RESPONSE 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Media-Type: JSON 
After the 200 OK response, there is no further communication from hosting server 
and there is no provision for integrity verification. Content is then displayed. It is 
difficult to place confidence in the data because, as mentioned previously, without 
any security or integrity-checking mechanism in place, the file is still vulnerable to 
accidental corruption and interception attacks. 
Communication using the proposed architecture. The following example illus-
trates use of the proposed architecture from the perspective of the end user: 
 
Fig. 2. Open Data User Case Illustration 
Steps Description 
1, 2, 3 DNSSEC enabled Address Resolution 
4, 5 Open Data Resource Lookup 
6, 7, 8, 9 HOUND Integrity Verification Process 
Table 2. Process of Fig. 4. Open Data User Case  
In communication with the end-user, the proposed architecture does not change the 
request-response format of HTTP communication, but rather augments it with the 
previously mentioned security components. 
#REQUEST 
GET /dataset/…/streetsandsuburbs HTTP/1.1\r\n 
Host: opendataregistry.org 
Content-Type: … 
At this stage, as before, address resolution is performed, incorporating DNSSEC to 
authenticate the DNS Server and provide defence against cache poisoning or man-in-
the-middle attacks. As mentioned in a previous section, a DNSSEC validator is in-
stalled on the client-side and validates the incoming content. 
After the address resolution is performed successfully, communications proceed as 
per normal and a response from the hosting server is received. As per RFC2616 [24], 
a successful request should contain a 2xx or a 3xx status code depending on the HTTP 
method used. If an error on the client-side is perceived, the server should return a 4xx 
status code but if an error occurs on the server-side a 5xx status code should be re-
turned to the client.  
#RESPONSE 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Media-Type: JSON 
Content-Length: … 
In this case, the response contains a status code and the actual message which is digi-
tally signed and accompanied by a digital certificate. The verifier module is then 
called to verify the integrity and authenticity of the received message. At the end of 
verifier module process, the message or content should be displayed if both the certif-
icate and signature pass verification. The following is pseudocode describing the 
functioning of the verifier module: 
#VERIFIER-PSEUDOCODE 
GET DownloadedContent 
READ Digital_Sign from DownloadedContent 
EXTRACT KeyFileNumber from Digital_Sign 
 
GET PublicKeyFile matching KeyFileNumber 
RETRIEVE PublicKey from PublicKeyFile 
  
CALL  Decrypt_Sign with PublicKey and Digital_Sign    
      RETURNING decrypt_result 
STORE decrypt_result in hash1 
 
CALL  hash_compute with DownloadedContent  
      RETURNING hash_result 
STORE hash_result in hash2 
 
IF hash1 = hash2 THEN 
 SHOW message: integrity and authenticity verified 
 DISPLAY DownloadedContent 
ELSE 
 SHOW message: failed integrity check 
 TERMINATE 
END IF 
END 
This procedure assumes DNSSEC is enabled. However, should DNSSEC not be 
available, HOUND should use HTTPS as a minimum for integrity to retrieve the ap-
propriate public key from the Public Key File at the Registry for signature verifica-
tion. 
REST URI Interface with proposed architecture. Each dataset may contain one or 
more resource files, which is linked to a particular digital signature file and is associ-
ated with the identity and public key of the dataset owner/creator at the Registry. 
 
Table 3. URI interface 
When a GET request is called for a dataset, e.g. GET /datasets/sampledataset, the 
server returns a listing of resource files and their URIs. From the information in that 
list, a GET request may then be sent for an individual resource, e.g. GET 
Sample Dataset (URI: …/datasets/sampledataset) 
Resource File #1 
(resourcefile1.csv) 
Digital Signature 
File #1 
(resourcefile1.sig) 
Digital Signature 
File #2  
(resourcefile2.sig) 
Digital Signature 
File #3  
(resourcefile3.sig) 
Resource File #2 
(resourcefile2.csv) 
Resource File #3 
(resourcefile3.csv) 
…/sampledataset/resource1 …/sampledataset/resource3 …/sampledataset/resource2 
/datasets/sampledataset/resource1, which should retrieve both the resource file and the 
associated digital signature. All the information is then used in the signature value 
with the algorithm described in Section 3.2. See Appendix 1 for a previously existing 
implementation sample of a signature verifier in concrete code.  
4.3 Conclusion and Future Work 
This paper proposes an architecture that uses digital signatures in conjunction with an 
associated public key file with the main goal to protect the integrity of Open Data 
communicated over the Web. This is a simplification of current public key certificate 
structures which use large revocation lists for certificate currency and have demon-
strated problems in scalability and “certificate authority” trust. 
The key element of this architecture is that it is based on DNSSEC, which is more 
appropriate to the new world of IPv6. The advantages of this architecture scheme is 
that it is far more scalable, not another certificate authority hierarchy with massive 
dispersion of key certificates which has of late become too widespread and unman-
ageable. With the use of a Public Key File, if the key is compromised; it is a simple 
matter of the single responsible entity replacing the key pair with a new one and re-
performing the data file signing process. 
Responsibility for authenticating Open Data is separated from any other certificate 
authority that might be used by the publishing entity. Under this proposed architec-
ture, the Open Data environment does not interfere with the internal security schemes 
that might be employed by the entity. However, this architecture incorporates, when 
needed, parameters from the entity, e.g. person who authorized publishing as Open 
Data, at the time that datasets are created/added.  
Future work will include the building of a proof-of-concept system using the archi-
tecture in this paper and performing benchmarking against regular systems in con-
junction with penetration testing. An interesting philosophical question which may be 
studied in further papers is: what responsibility does an entity, whether private or 
public, take on when it makes Open Data available? Further study on the issue of 
Open Data and governance requirements must be done.  
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6 Appendix 1 – Open Source Java Signature Verifier 
Implementation by Technische Universität Darmstadt [25] 
//Imported necessary dependencies 
01 import java.io.File; 
02 import java.io.FileInputStream; 
03 import java.security.MessageDigest; 
04 import java.security.PrivateKey; 
05 import java.security.Security; 
06 import java.security.Signature; 
08 import codec.x509.X509Certificate; 
09 import de.flexiprovider.common.util.ByteUtils; 
10 import de.flexiprovider.core.FlexiCoreProvider; 
//Reading the Message for Verification 
18 File file = new File("xxx"); 
19 byte[] message = new byte[(int) file.length()]; 
20 FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(file); 
21 fis.read(message); 
22 fis.close(); 
//Reading the Digital Signature 
24 File file = new File("RSASignature.sig"); 
25 byte[] sigBytes = new byte[(int) file.length()]; 
26 FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(file); 
27 fis.read(sigBytes); 
28 fis.close(); 
29 
30 File file = new File("CertRSA.cer"); 
31 byte[] encCertRSA = new byte[(int) file.length()]; 
32 FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(file); 
33 fis.read(encCertRSA); 
34 fis.close(); 
… 
  
42 X509Certificate certRSA new X509Certificate(encCertRSA); 
43 X509Certificate certCA new X509Certificate(encCertCA); 
 
[Code Examples – Verifying Digital Signatures. https://www.flexiprovider.de/exam   
-ples/ExampleSMIMEverify.html] 
 
